The ambiguity over Taiwan is another example, so far, of how it works, for Taiwan and USA's allies at least. But I get the feeling that it rankles with Xi. Occasionally, the USA has had to replace ambiguity with certainty, by sailing its naval vessels into the waters separating the two, suggesting that ambiguity has its limits. Furthermore, as the PLA's power increases with every passing month, so any deterrent power of ambiguity dissipates.
More often than not, ambiguity leads simply to misperception and misunderstanding, because the very essence of it is confusion and opacity. This is why Hitler had a mini-breakdown when Chamberlain declared war, and why Putin allegedly was majorly taken aback when, while it withdrew its trainers instantly the invasion started, NATO members quickly provided intelligence and some resources to Ukraine.
The following point may be more relevant to the notion of victory than of ambiguity, but the IRA never had a chance of militarily defeating either British forces or its Loyalists in Northern Ireland, its strategy of violence was as much to get those in the Nationalist community and the Republic sitting on the fence off it, and being seen by its supporters to be at war as to win it. To the British, it made no sense for the IRA to commit its acts of violence. Similarly, just because "Russia doesn't have the forces to fight a war against NATO with even the faintest hope of victory" doesn't mean it wouldn't make alot of sense for Putin to take the war directly to NATO, forcing NATO members to stop sending weaponry to Ukraine in order to conserve their arsenals for self-defence, and also to raise the stakes for NATO to a level it never wanted to go nor is able to bring its citizens to accept. At a time when both Europe and the USA are manifestly failing to provide the military resources needed for a Ukrainian victory, raising the stakes would be a super-effective strategy, even if a favourable outcome for Russia were doubtful or uncertain.
Thank you for this post!
Another brilliant piece.
The ambiguity over Taiwan is another example, so far, of how it works, for Taiwan and USA's allies at least. But I get the feeling that it rankles with Xi. Occasionally, the USA has had to replace ambiguity with certainty, by sailing its naval vessels into the waters separating the two, suggesting that ambiguity has its limits. Furthermore, as the PLA's power increases with every passing month, so any deterrent power of ambiguity dissipates.
More often than not, ambiguity leads simply to misperception and misunderstanding, because the very essence of it is confusion and opacity. This is why Hitler had a mini-breakdown when Chamberlain declared war, and why Putin allegedly was majorly taken aback when, while it withdrew its trainers instantly the invasion started, NATO members quickly provided intelligence and some resources to Ukraine.
The following point may be more relevant to the notion of victory than of ambiguity, but the IRA never had a chance of militarily defeating either British forces or its Loyalists in Northern Ireland, its strategy of violence was as much to get those in the Nationalist community and the Republic sitting on the fence off it, and being seen by its supporters to be at war as to win it. To the British, it made no sense for the IRA to commit its acts of violence. Similarly, just because "Russia doesn't have the forces to fight a war against NATO with even the faintest hope of victory" doesn't mean it wouldn't make alot of sense for Putin to take the war directly to NATO, forcing NATO members to stop sending weaponry to Ukraine in order to conserve their arsenals for self-defence, and also to raise the stakes for NATO to a level it never wanted to go nor is able to bring its citizens to accept. At a time when both Europe and the USA are manifestly failing to provide the military resources needed for a Ukrainian victory, raising the stakes would be a super-effective strategy, even if a favourable outcome for Russia were doubtful or uncertain.